There are often two 'political' motivations for describing something as subjective: 1. you wish to encourage tolerance, ie. to suggest that since 'no one is right' there is no grounds for dismissing someone's opinion, 2. to emphases that the matter is not resolved, ie. that there is meaningful outstanding disagreement.
However both of these conditions require a matter to be objective, rather than subjective. Something which is subjective inevitably leads to arrogance and a lack of meaningful disagreement.
In this article I will outline in detail what it means for a matter to be subjective or objective and then consider some of the social consequences.
Definitions
Firstly there are several totally independent meanings of the words objective and subjective, which are linked only by analogy: metaphysical, epistemological and political.
Political (or journalistic) objectivity means 'fair treatment of the issue'– it's a duty on journalists. Politicalsubjectivity means an unfair treatment of an issue – for example, misleading a person so they give you the quote you want. Note, this is a moral duty, and is not itself about the truth or the nature of the world but about what people should do.
Epistemologicalobjectivity means that the truth of some statement depends on the world being a certain way; epistemologicalsubjectivity means the truth of some statement depends on a person's representing (, asserting, believing, ..) something. Objectivity here then is about how a belief is true, it is not about any individual's responsibility nor about the nature of an object.
Metaphysicalobjectivity means that the existence of an object is independent to any thoughts (about it); metaphysical subjectivity means that the existence of an object directly depends on a mind. This 'metaphysical dependence' is a very special kind, for an object to be subjective it would have to stop existing if someone (something) stopped thinking: eg. we might say a thought itself is metaphysically subjective since it depends on a mind - though the classical case is pain: pain is something felt.
Epistemological objectivity-subjectivity is a about beliefs (, propositions, etc.) - if they're about the world or what people feel. Metaphysical objectivity-subjectivity is about objects - if they're "in the mind" or "in the world".
Examples
While all three are often confused for one another, confusion between the latter two is most philosophically troublesome. To get familiar with these concepts let's apply them to some situations.
First, let's consider claims about the world. For example, “the moon is in the sky”. This claim is epistemologically objective, meaning that it is true if and only if the world is a certain way, ie. that there is a moon in the sky. To say a claim is objective is not to say it is true, in otherwords the claim, “the sun is made of gold” is an objective claim, but it is false.
Now for something more confusing: chess. The claim “moving a king at the start of a game is illegal” is epistemologically objective, it is true in virtue of the rules of the game not in any persons beliefs about those rules (etc.). What would it mean to be true in virtue of someone's beliefs? Well it would mean that someone's decision that it's illegal is what makes illegal – but surely this isnt the case, no one's 'change of mind' about whether something is illegal changes whether it is illegal or not. A king-move isn't suddenly permissible because, on one morning, Fred feels happy. If we're playing chess – then we're following the rules of chess – and in virtue of following those rules some moves we make are illegal, and that's true no matter what a person believes. Once the rules are set, which moves conform to those rules is not a "mere opinon".
This does not mean that chess does not depend on beliefs, thoughts, etc. in other ways. For example, in order for people to play chess it had to be invented. And in order for chess games to be played there have to people who believe things about it. But, very specifically, truth-claims about whether “moves are illegal given a set of rules” are just about those rules.
Now, the metaphysical question about chess enters – what are 'rules'? What are 'pieces' etc.? They're not physical at least – since anyone can play chess without having any pieces. And pieces of any kind can represent a chess game. Some people believe that anything non-physical must be metaphysically subjective – I take this view to be mistaken, but let's switch to another example to say something more interesting.
Why is “2 + 2 = 4” true? First let us observe that its truth is objective – no one's opinion makes it the case. It isn’t possible to change our minds about whether “2 + 2 = 4” if “2” means 2, “4” means 4, “+” means + and “=” means = , then the claims is true no matter what a person thinks about it.
Some people in confusing epistemologically objectivity with metaphysical make a strange kind of objection, they say “2 + 2 = 4” was not “always true”. However truth doesn’t have spatial or temporal properties. We couldn't state“2 + 2 = 4” before we existed, but us existing has nothing to do with why its true: its truth does not depend on us.
Another confusion is to worry that because we're required to articulate something what we articulate must be subjective, ie. “everything we say(, invent, ...) is subjective because we articulate it”. This is just obviously mistaken: when I say “there is a pen on the table” i'm not saying something about myself – it's about a pen and a table. I may, of course be wrong – but that doesn’t change what I’m talking about.
This mistake leads to view any system invented by humans as necessarily subjective: that since we invent mathematical/chess/linguistic conventions what they are about is subjective. No: while we are required to articulate a convention (ie. the convention depends on us) – what our convention describes can be either subjective or objective: about our minds, or about the world.
For a (possibly) subjective claim consider “Strawberries are nice” - this sounds like its either true or false, ie. that you can meaningfully say “the claim 'strawberries are nice' is false” - but that its being true depends on some person's opinion. That is, it seems like “strawberries are nice” is epistemologically subjective – it's truth depends on my opinion of strawberries, if my opinion changes then the truth of the claim I make changes.
Applications
Given that “2 + 2 = 4” is true independent of anyone's beliefs about anything, what exactly makes it true? In other-words, what are the things '2', '4', '+', '='? I would consider these metaphysically objective too – and by this I mean only that their existence doesn't metaphysically depend on some person's ideas. That is there is such a thing '2' and this thing would not somehow “cease to be” if someone died or changed their mind or thought differently.
To narrow in on this metaphysics we need to ask, “what does 'exists' mean?”. Here, “what does '2 exists' mean?” - I take 'exists' to be a very minimal concept. People sometimes get anxious when you say “2 exists” because they take existence to imply certain properties, mostly, a spatial or temporal location. That is they think you mean something like “there's a physical object called 2”. However we can rephrase claims like 'atoms exists' as 'there are things such that they have a spatial location, a temporal location, a mass, a size, a….' - ie. we can say “there are things” quite generally – without implying anything in particular about the nature of the object in question.
For some things it doesn’t make any sense to ask spatial questions, “where is Tuesday?” or “what colour is Energy?” are meaningless. These questions take, eg. Engery to have properties like, eg. Colour when they do not. Equally it is meaningless to say “where is 2?” But I take there to be such a thing as “2” because all I mean is something quite trivial by “there exists” - that is, just 'something with some properties that can be discriminated from something else with some properties'. Two follows one, and two is prime, (...etc.) – therefore there is '2'.
Whether that sounds convincing enough, its important to realise there is a distinction over whether a something is epistemologically and metaphysically objective. You might say “strawberries are nice” is true in virtue of someone’s opinion (epistemologically subjective) but 'tasting nice' is a physical property of someone's brain(, body) and therefore metaphysically objective. I would, at least.
Politics
How does this clarify political and social discussions? First, let's observe there can be no grounds to disagree on something epistemologically subjective – so disagreement itself implies objectivity. For Corpencus to say 'the sun is at the centre of the solar system' and others to disagree he had to be saying more than 'I feel happy' or 'I'd like it if the sun is at the centre' because that is indisputable: there is no reply, nor motivation to disagree with the prima fascie feelings of a person. Indeed since a person often knows with certainty what it is the feel about something, there can be no disagreement whatsoever to “I feel this way”.
People were actually talking about the objects 'sun', 'earth', etc. which exist M-objectively and were making E-objective claims about the truth of their location with respect to each other. Each group was saying one thing with reasons, evidence, etc. based on observations of the world (MO) an making claims true about the world (EO).
Equally when I say “this is a good movie” I do not mean merely, “I was in an enjoyable mood while this movie played” - since in the latter case, who could disagree? I mean something like, “given then aims I take the creator of the movie I take to have, and the aims of cinema that it implicitly adopts, this movie is successful”. I mean something like, “that is a very good chess move!”. And claims of this kind are objective: whether something meets its aims is independent of anyone's beliefs. The relationship between a game of chess and the rules of the game is objective.
Something like this view is essential for explaining how people meaningfully disagree about cinema. How is it that people have arguments and make coherent points and change their views? And what makes a person change their mind? If my quick sketch of aesthetic judgement is correct, then the answer is relatively clear: people disagree about how successful a work of art is against its aims (and also about what its aims were, ie. what kind of game was the artist trying to play). And that's something objective they can disagree about.
Equally humility requires objectivity. There is no meaningful humility with respect to what you believe about something, or what you feel about something: you know that! Thus there is something profoundly misguided in people who opt for moral relativism or subjectivism on the basis of cultural relativism or cultural humility.
In other words, if people disagree about what's moral that implies “what's moral” is not just some sentiment – people do not disagree about their sentiments: when we have an argument about morality we're not being psychiatrists – we're not saying “I think you were really feeling this”. But rather we advance propositions about objective properties of the world and human beings in it.
If people wish to have some moral humility, this is only possible given that they do not know what's moral.
Let's take the pressing claim which people seem to have widely adopted post-Iraq: “you should not apply your culture's morality to some other's” – if morality were 'relative', then so is this principle. In other words, here is an entirely consistent reply: “in our culture we apply our moral principles to everyone, so it is right we do so, because that is our culture”. In other words without something external to people's beliefs, without something for morality to be about then there is only moral arrogance: moral claims are true because they're “felt” and we may – and do - feel whatever we like.
And this subjectivist view of morality seems quite inconsistent with the many successful moral disagreements and arguments people have: I can say things to other people to change their minds, and that has a chance of working. I'm not just saying “I don’t like this” over and over – because what force does that have? I say things like “this action causes this person to suffer needlessly”, ie., I'm making an objective claim about the consequences of an action and (for some reason) this is persuasive. I would take this to be persuasive because morality is like chess, as soon as we start playing the game there are “good moves” and so on. The task of a moral philosophy is to spell out what the “rules” of morality are that correctly account for how, in fact, we manage to successfully play this game.
The lingering nihilist questions, “why enter the game of morality (, mathematics, chess, film critique...)” don't have objective answers but if you're playing chess you don't get to decide what's allowed. And since we are already moral creatures (, etc.) we need only find out good reasons to disagree – and hold that we may be mistaken about the conclusions we reach.
Thus the meta-meta-ethical question that nihilists imply when they say “morality isn't really objective” is mostly irrelevant: whilst there is nothing I can do to persuade you to play chess, I need only observe we're all ready playing. Nihilism is mostly already taking place half-way through games by people upset about how they're being played – its far too late for that! When two people disagree morally it is rather disingenuous to say “well there is no reason I ought to be moral!” - you are already moral – just, perhaps, a bad player and we can assess that quite objectively indeed.
